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INTRODCUTION

I.

This reply brief will demonstrate that

TRC’s

efforts to

frame the issue 0n appeal as one

involving a “grand bargain” between Idaho workers and their employers 0r policies designed t0

prevent an injured worker from being overcompensated are without merit.

that

TRC’s arguments concerning

the

meaning of I.C.

It

will then be

§ 72-102(13)(a) are not

supported by the

plain language of the statute and, in fact, conﬂict With this Court’s decision in Venters

Delaware,

Inc, 141

Idaho 245, 108 P3d 392 (2005). Instead, the

and

this Court’s decisions construing the statute,

that

TRC was

show

statute,

shown

combined with

v.

Sorrento

its

purpose

that the district court erred in concluding

Dale Kelly’s statutory employer and thereby immune from the Kellys’ negligence

claims.

REPLY ARGUMENT

II.

A.

Idaho Court D0 Not Characterize Statutory Employer Immunity As Being Part Of A
“Grand Bargain” Between Idaho Workers And Their Employers.

At

the outset

it

should be noted that TRC’s efforts t0 frame the issue 0f this appeal are

misleading and without merit.
court’s

summary judgment

First,

TRC would have this Court believe that reversal of the district

decision

would

unfairly deprive

TRC

0f the beneﬁts 0f the “grand

bargain” that exists between Idaho workers and their employers.1

TRC

is

mistaken in two

respects.

1

The phrase “grand bargain” appears

in

Respondent’s Brief at pages

7, 24,

and 29.

First, the

phrase “grand bargain” has not appeared in any of this Court’s decisions in the

103 years since the Idaho Legislature enacted the state’s ﬁrst worker’s compensation laws in
1917.2

it

was

The phrase did not appear

in appellate decisions

ﬁrst used in a dissenting opinion in Satterlee

v.

from other jurisdictions

until

2009 When

Lumberman ’s Mutual Casually

C0.,

222

P.3d 566, 579 (Mont. 2009) (“The workers” compensation system in Montana constitutes a grand
bargain in which injured workers forego the possibility 0f larger awards potentially available

through the

tort

system (the quid) in exchange for a no

fault

system that provides more certainty

0f an award (the quo).”).
Second, as Satterlee

illustrates,

the courts that have used the phrase do

characterizing the basic trade-off inherent in

TRC’S

suggestion, grand bargain

liability or

is

all

workers’ compensation systems.

not a phrase used by courts

so

When

Contrary to

When discussing statutory employer

immunity.3 As stated in the Appellants’ opening brief

at

page

9, this

Court has aptly

described the dual policy considerations underlying the Idaho’s Workers Compensation Act

Without using the phrase “grand bargain.”

Gomez v. Crookham Ca, 166 Idaho

249, 255, 457 P.3d

901, 907 (2020). Those policy considerations are “t0 provide employees a remedy Which

is

expeditious and independent of proof 0f fault, but also for employers a liability which

limited

and determinative.” Id. This case presents n0 reason for the Court

2

Roe

is

t0 incorporate the phrase

both

“grand

’s

Ina, 141 Idaho 524, 527, 112 P.3d 812, 815 (2005) (“In 1917, our
legislature enacted the state’s ﬁrst worker’s compensation laws. 1917 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 81;
Giﬁ’ord v. Nottingham, 68 Idaho, 330, 340, 193 P.2d 831, 837 (1948) (Holden, J., dissenting».
3

v.

Albertson

Emily A.

The Grand Bargain: Compensationfor Work Injuries
69 Rutgers University Law Review, V01. 69, fn.4, pp.927-28.

Spieler, (Re)assessing

United States, 1900-20] 7,

in the

TRC’S suggestion

bargain” into Idaho jurisprudence.
the foundation of the grand bargain

B.

is

that Kellys’ points

and authorities threaten

Without merit.

Statutory Employer Immunity Is Unrelated

T0 Rules Preventing Injured Workers

From Obtaining Double Recoveries.
The same ﬂaws
judgment so

exist With

as to prevent

immunity has nothing

t0

TRC’s

assertion that the district court granted

Dale Kelly from receiving a double recovery.4 Statutory employer

do With the Idaho Legislature wanting

being overcompensated for their

injuries. Rather, the statutory

increase the likelihood that an injured worker will receive his

unscrupulous employers t0 avoid responsibility for work

who

fail to

TRC summary

v.

workers from

employer laws are designed

t0

work comp beneﬁts by not allowing

comp beneﬁts by

have work comp insurance for their employees. Adam

Idaho 6444, 646, 470 P.2d 409, 411 (1970); Harpole

t0 prevent injured

v.

State, 131

using subcontractors

Titan Equip. Supply Corp, 93

Idaho 437, 440, 958 P.2d 594,

597 (1998). Also, since 1996, the immunity aspect of being a statutory employer has mirrored
those instances Where the statutory employer faces potential liability for

work comp beneﬁts when

the direct employer fails to have workers compensation insurance. Robison v Bateman-Hall, Ina,

139 Idaho 207, 21

1,

76 P.3d 951, 955 (2003).

Moreover, the Act has never prevented injured employees from collecting workers’

compensation beneﬁts and also pursuing
tortfeasors. In

this

4

Schneider

v.

tort liability

Farmers Merchant, Ina, 106 Idaho 241, 243, 678 P.2d

Court endorsed the following statement from

Respondent’s Brief,

p.2.

claims against non—employer third-party

its

earlier decision in

Tucker

v.

33, 35 (1984),

Union Oil C0. 0f

n0 question but

California, 100 Idaho 590, 603, 603 P.2d 15, 1696 (1979), “[t]here appears

may

an injured employee

receive

workman’s compensation beneﬁts and

Who was

negligence action against a third-party tortfeasor

illustrated

by the Schneider case,

the

t0 ensure the injured

not overcompensated. Those include giving the employer, if not at

is

against the employee’s tort recovery, 0r otherwise reducing the
the employee’s workers compensation beneﬁts.

Idaho

at

The

245, 678 P.2d at 37. Also see, Mamvilla

v.

later

thereafter bring a

a non-employer. LC. § 7-223.”

Act and courts use other methods

fault,

J.R. Simplot C0,, 161

As

worker

a subrogation right

damage award by

method was used

that

the

amount 0f

in Schneider. Id.,

106

Idaho 455, 462-63, 387

P.3d 123, 130-31 (2016).
C.

Statutory Employer Immunity Applies Only T0 Those
Contracts And Pay For The Services Rendered.

Moving
of I.C.

to the central issue

of this appeal,

TRC

§ 72-102(13)(a) justiﬁes the district court’s

statutory

employer immunity

which “envisions” 0r
“service.”

TRC

is

also argues that

Enter Into Service

mistakenly argues that the plain language

summary judgment

bestowed upon a party Who enters

“results” in

Who

decision.

TRC asserts that

into a contract

someone being “expressly or impliedly hired”

immunity applies

of any kind

to

to all persons 0r entities in a chain

perform a

0f contracts

Whenever the injured worker was hired by an upstream contractors

TRC’S arguments
address. In

Gomez

v.

implicate the rules of statutory interpretation, which

Crookham Company, 166 Idaho 249, 253, 457 P.3d 901, 905

Court explained that the obj ective of statutory interpretation

5

TRC

Respondent’s Brief, pp.2,

5,

8

and

14.

is

did not

(2020), this

to derive the legislative intent.

Such

begins with the

literal

language 0f the

applies the plain and ordinary

statute.

To determine

the

meaning of the terms and, Where

sentence should be given effect. In State

v.

meaning of the

statute, the

Court

possible, every word, clause

347 P.3d 1189, 1193

Olivas, 158 Idaho 375, 379,

(2015), the Court elaborated that only where the language of the statute

and

is

ambiguous will the

Court 100k t0 the rules 0f construction for guidance and consider the reasonableness 0f a proposed
interpretation.

construction.

A

statute is

Ambiguous

ambiguous Where language

statutes

mean. The Court determines

t0

must be construed

legislative intent

to

is

capable 0f more than one reasonable

mean what

by examining

the Legislature intended

the literal

words 0f the

them

statute,

along With the reasonableness 0f the proposed construction, public policy behind the statute and

its

legislative history.

LC.

§ 72-102(13)(a),

deﬁnes a category one statutory employer as follows:

“Employer” means any person who has expressly 0r impliedly hired 0r contracted
the services of another. It includes contractors and subcontractors.
Black’s

Law

Dictionary deﬁnes “hire” as “t0 engage the labor or services 0f another for

wages 0r other payment.”6

A person hires the services of another when they agree to pay wages

0r other compensation to the other person in exchange for performance 0f the speciﬁed services.

Based on the deﬁnition 0f “contract,” a person contracts

for the services 0f another

When

they

enter into an agreement that creates an enforceable obligation for the other person to perform

speciﬁed services.

6
7

BLACKS’
Id. at 318.

7

T0 be

enforceable the

LAW DICTIONARY, 735 (7th ed.

contract

for

services

1999) (emphasis added).

must be supported by

consideration, typically a promise of

services.

Sirius

Davidson

LC.

may be

Soelberg, 154 Idaho 227, 232, 296 P.3d 433, 438 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing

v.

Turner Ins. Agency, Ina, 96 Idaho 691, 695, 535 P.2d 664, 668 (1975)).

expressly hire the services of another 0r t0 expressly contract for services of another

ambiguous.

TRC

argues

it

includes

all

types 0f contracts, Which contain any service

component, large or small, integral 0r incidental. Kellys interpret the
persons

to the person performing the

Erickson, 144 Idaho 38, 42, 156 Idaho P.3d 539, 543 (2007); General Motors

v.

Acceptance Corp.

T0

v.

payment from the employer

Who

statute as covering only those

enter into service contracts With an independent contractor for performance 0f

speciﬁed services in consideration for payment from the “employer.”

The plain wording of

the statute does not support

“employer” includes everyone

Who

TRC’s arguments.

enters into a contract of

It

does not say

any kind, provided the contract

includes a component of service, large 0r small, integral 0r incidental. Likewise, the statute does

not say “employer” includes everyone

who enters into a contract that envisions or somehow results

in another person being hired or contracted with to

Instead, Appellants submit that a

“employer”

t0

one

who

perform the services.

more reasonable

hires or contracts

interpretation 0f the statute limits an

and pays for the services of another.

If the contract

covers services and non-service matters, the service component must be paramount so that the
contract can be fairly characterized as a service contract.

Dale in Schuler

v.

Battelle

Energy

All.,

The predominant factor test used by Judge

LLC, N0. 4:18-CV-00234-CWD, 2019

Idaho Oct. 18, 2019), would be useﬁll in that regard.

WL 5295461

The Legislature never intended

(D.

statutory

employer immunity to apply to the purchaser of goods, even With incidental and ancillary delivery.

Appellants’ position

supported by this Court’s decisions on statutory employer immunity

is

addressed in their opening
In Venters

v.

brief.

Such includes Venters and Spencer discussed ﬁthher below.

Sorrento Delaware, Inc, 141 Idaho 245, 249, 108 P3d 392, 396 (2005), this

Court suggested that category one immunity

is

limited t0 those persons

who

hire or contract with

another so as to create at least “an indirect contractual employment relationship” between the
putative statutory employer and the injured worker.

The Court held

that Montierth

Farms was not

a category one statutory employer 0f Mr. Venters, the deceased truck driver, since there

was not

even an indirect employment relationship between the deceased truck driver and Montierth Farms.
Instead,

it

was Sorrento

that hired

Montierth Farms’ property so

it

3-C Trucking

t0 transport its

wastewater t0

its

storage tanks 0n

could be used as irrigation water by Montierth Farms. 3-C

Trucking in turn hired the drivers, including Mr. Venters. Instead 0f entering into a direct or
indirect

employment

Sorrento for

its

relationship with the driver, Montierth

Farms had simply contracted With

wastewater. The fact that the Sorrento-Montierth Farms contract envisioned 0r

resulted in a trucking

company and

its

drivers being hired to deliver the wastewater to Montierth

Farms’ property was not enough t0 qualify Montierth Farms as the driver’s statutory employer.

Not

surprisingly,

and Montierth Farms.
Trucking for

its

TRC

by

the seller.

argues that

its

status is

more

closely aligned to that of Sorrento than

overlooks the key fact that Sorrento expressly contracted With 3-C

transportation services and paid for those services. In contrast,

contract with a trucking

for the purchase

TRC

company for delivery services.

Instead,

TRC

did not

TRC simply entered into a contract

of goods, with incidental and ancillary delivery arranged and paid for separately

TRC’S
is

also

discussion ofSpencer

ﬂawed. Procedurally,

Commission ultimately ruled
stated

TRC
that

v.

Allpress Logging, Ina, 134 Idaho 856, 11 P.3d 475 (2000),

mistakenly asserted 0n Page 16 0f

on Page 19 0f Appellants’ opening

at

statutory

477-78.

More

brief that the Industrial

Weyerhaeuser was Spencer’s statutory employer. As correctly
brief, the

Idaho Industrial Commission ultimately

concluded that Weyerhaeuser was not Spencer’s statutory employer.
P.3d

its

Id.

134 Idaho

importantly, While this Court held that Weyerhaeuser
liable for Spencer’s

employer and therefore

at

858-59, 11

was Spencer’s

workman’s compensation beneﬁts,

it

was not

because Weyerhaeuser had entered into a contract to purchase timber from Schilling, With
incidental delivery 0f the timber t0 Weyerhaeuser’s sawmill. Instead, this Court concluded that

Weyerhaeuser was the statutory employer of Spencer because

it

had also entered

into a contract

With Schilling for harvesting the timber and agreed to pay Schilling additional sums for
harvesting the timber

was contracting with

When each load was

delivered. This Court reasoned that since

Schilling for logging,

it

had clearly entered

Weyerhaeuser

into a contract for services,

thereby making Weyerhaeuser a statutory employer under the Act and responsible for paying

Spencer’s

work comp beneﬁts.

In reaching this decision, the Court emphasized that

load of harvested timber was delivered to Weyerhaeuser, Weyerhaeuser issued
the cost 0f harvesting the timber. Id. Unlike the facts of Spencer,

a transportation

company and did not

Jay Transport and Dale Kelly. Also,

0fthe purchase price for the

steel

issue

Brown

payment

TRC

its

when each

check

to cover

did not hire the services 0f

for the transportation services provided

Strauss’s invoice to

TRC

by

did not allocate any portion

tubing t0 transportation costs. For these reasons, the district court

erred in applying Spencer t0 the facts of this case and using

was Dale’s

TRC,
statutory

at

page 25 of

its brief,

employer relationship

differences

to support its conclusion that

TRC

statutory employer.

TRC Has Conceded The Point Of Appellants’

D.

it

conceded

“it

Hypothetical.

may be

reasonable for a court t0

exists in the Kellys’ hypothetical scenario.”

between the hypothetical and

this case are

only ones 0f scale,

ﬁnd

that

n0

Since the factual

TRC

is

conceding the

reasonableness of Appellants’ position that there was n0 statutory employer relationship between

TRC

and Dale Kelly.
III.

The Legislature never intended

TRC

goods. The contract between

only.

Act

Because

is

TRC

inapplicable,

CONCLUSION

to extend statutory

employer immunity

to purchasers

0f

and Brown Strauss was a contract for the purchase of goods

did not enter into a contact for services, the Idaho Worker’s Compensation

and

TRC

is

not entitled t0 statutory employer immunity under the Act.

Alternatively, the Court should hold that purchasers of goods with ancillary delivery are not

statutory employers 0f the delivery persons

and are not

entitled t0 statutory

employer immunity

under the Act.

For these reasons and

all

others discussed above and in their opening brief, the Appellants

respectﬁllly urge this Court t0 reverse the district court’s

summary judgment

in favor

of

TRC

Memorandum

Decision granting

and the Judgment of Dismissal, allowing for further

proceedings 0n the negligence and loss of consortium claims set forth in their complaint.
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